Abstract-We study the prevalence of informal caregiving to elderly parents by their mature daughters in Europe and the links between parental health, intense (daily) caregiving, and the employment status of daughters. We group data from SHARE into three country pools (North, Central, and South), which differ in the availability of public formal care services and female labor market attachment. There is a strong North-South gradient in the (positive) effect of parental ill health on the probability of daily caregiving. The loss of employment ascribable to daily informal caregiving seems negligible, except in southern countries. We use a time allocation model to provide a link to an empirical IV-treatment effects framework and to interpret our findings.
I. Introduction
P OPULATION ageing is an important demographic trend in all European countries. As a result of ageing, the demand for care by the elderly is already very high and may increase in the future. It is well known that the family represents one of the most important sources of help, especially older daughters (Attias-Donfut et al., 2005) . In this paper, we use data from the first two waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to study the prevalence of informal caregiving to disabled parents by their mature daughters across European countries, as well as the effect of intense daily caregiving on the employment status of the daughters.
Measuring the prevalence of caregiver women and the opportunity costs that this may represent for them in terms of reduced employment is relevant in the debate about the design of optimal public long-term care systems and in the implementation of programs to support informal caregivers. The analysis of this question across European countries is of particular interest. On the one hand, there is substantial heterogeneity among European countries with respect to the availability and generosity of public formal care services and long-term care benefits, with the northern countries having extremely generous and universal long-term care systems and the southern countries covering only basic needs of the poorest elderly. On the other hand, there is an important difference in the degree of labor force attachment and the level of education that runs from northern to southern countries with northern mature-aged women having much higher employment rates. These two factors are important sources of variation for the question under study. This paper exploits the cross-country variation represented in the SHARE data to learn about the relationship of parental ill health, informal caregiving, and employment of mature European women. 1 Our paper is closely related to the literature that has sought to estimate the causal effect of informal caregiving on the labor supply of caregivers. Most work in this literature has specified empirical reduced-form relationships between labor supply outcomes and measures of informal care. In most cases, the outcomes covered both the extensive and intensive labor margins, whereas the measures of informal care were binary. The focus of the empirical investigation was usually the sign and significance of the coefficient(s) on informal care and the calculation of average effects of care on labor supply. In order to deal with the simultaneity-endogeneity of informal care, several instruments were proposed and their relevance and validity was more or less informally discussed. The largest number of studies have used data from the United States (Ettner, 1995 (Ettner, , 1996 Johnson & Lo Sasso, 2000; Wolf & Soldo, 1994) . There has been less work on this topic using European data (Heitmueller & Michaud, 2006; Spiess & Schneider, 2003; Bolin, Lindgren, & Lundborg, 2008; Casado-Marín, García-Gómez, & López-Nicolás, 2011; Crespo, 2008) . The estimates of the impact of informal caregiving on labor supply range from significant and clearly negative, to very small or not significantly different from 0. The lack of a clear consensus may be due to differences in the samples studied, the choice of instruments, or, probably, differences in the binary care indicators because information on the intensity of informal care has been used in different ways or was not available.
In this paper, we revisit the estimation of the effect of the provision of informal care to elderly parents on their daughters' employment. 2 We make the following contributions.
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First, our empirical work is based on an instrumental variabletreatment effects framework (IV-TE) (Imbens & Angrist, 1994; Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005) . The IV-TE framework emphasizes heterogeneity of treatment effects and shows what causal parameters can be (nonparametrically) identified by IV estimates when selection into treatment is not random. Given the extent of variation in the labor market behavior of mature daughters within and across European countries, it is highly implausible that the effect of providing informal care on employment is homogeneous. Second, we present a simple model of the daughter's allocation of time to labor supply and informal care, which includes the utility derived from the well-being of the care recipient. The model predicts that the reservation wage when caring is higher than when not caring. Thus the "treatment effect" of daily caring on employment is likely to be nonmonotonic in potential wages: 0 for low and high wages and −1 between the two reservation wages. Third, the comparison across country groups defined by variation in the availability and generosity of public long-term care benefits has center stage in our paper. In particular, we perform all our estimations separately for each group of countries and use the behavioral model as a guide to interpret and rationalize the differences found across countries. 3 Finally, we exploit the richness of the SHARE data, including its longitudinal dimension and the availability of multidimensional measures of the health of parents and the care they receive from sources other than their daughter. 4 Our analysis is limited to binary indicators of labor supply and informal care. We show that the extensive margins are the most important source of variation in the data. 5 Our measure of labor supply is an employment indicator, and we focus on informal care provided on a daily basis because this help is much more likely to represent a significant burden competing with labor supply in the time allocation of these women. 3 Bolin et al. (2008) use the first wave of the SHARE data to estimate the effect of hours of informal care provided to elderly parents on employment, hours of work, and wages for men and women between 50 and 64 years old. Their results imply that one extra (weekly) hour of informal care has a negative effect on the probability of employment of −0.032% and −0.028% for men and women, respectively, and significantly different from 0 at the 10% level. In their main specification, informal care is found to be exogenous in the employment equation, and it is assumed that it is homogeneous for all countries. When including group dummies to account for differential effects relating to the North-South gradient in the availability of publicly financed long-term care services, their estimates do not reveal any patterns that can be linked to institutional differences. 4 We are not the first to use longitudinal data to bear on this topic. Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000) , Heitmuller and Michaud (2006), and Casado et al. (2011) estimate panel data models with permanent unobserved heterogeneity in order to improve identification of the causal effect of caring on labor supply. Instead, we focus on the impact of longitudinal variation in the health of parents on the cross-sectional joint distribution of employment and caregiving choices. 5 The only alternative would be to consider mixed discrete-continuous models for both outcomes. However, it does not seem feasible to implement an empirical IV-TE framework for a mixed discrete-continuous treatment and to provide careful interpretation within an explicit behavioral model. Most of the papers before ours have used empirical models that combined a mixed discrete-continuous outcome (labor supply) with a binary treatment (caregiving). However, interpreting the effect of binary caregiving on continuous hours worked in terms of a behavioral model is less interesting.
The main empirical findings are as follows. For women between ages 50 and 60, the aggregate loss of employment that can be attributed to daily informal caregiving is negligible in northern and central European countries but not in southern countries. Most women in all countries will never take up daily caregiving, but in southern countries, there is a sizable group willing to provide daily care to disabled parents. In the South a broad measure of parental disability induces approximately 20% of daughters to take up daily care. Of these, between 45% and 65% drop out of employment; the local average treatment effect (LATE) is between −0.45 and −0.65 as obtained from two different sets of results. These estimates are not very precise, but even larger and strongly significant employment and caregiving impacts are found for particular combinations of parental disability conditions (e.g., daughters whose parents have dementia). Low-skilled daughters who work but are close to the margin of participation also exhibit larger employment and caregiving impacts even though the employment effects are not estimated with precision. Our model offers plausible interpretations of most of these findings.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section II describes the data: samples, variables, descriptive statistics, and correlations. Section III contains the conceptual framework: we present a simple time allocation model that we use to discuss the parameters of interest identified in an IV-TE framework. Section IV reports the empirical results: evidence based in cross-sectional variation in the health of parents, longitudinal variation in the health of parents, and multiple measures of parental disability. Section V concludes.
II. The Data
The target population of this study is women at risk of having to both provide care to elderly parents and work in paid employment. We are interested in women because daughters are named by far as the most important source of help by elders. We focus on women aged between 50 and 60 with at least one living parent at the moment of the interview. Women of this age are the most likely to be involved in the personal care of their elderly parents (Attias-Donfut et al., 2005) , and at the same time, they can still be part of the labor force. We exclude women older than 60 to minimize issues related to retirement decisions. 6 We use data from the first two waves of SHARE collected by personal interviews in 2004 and 2006-2007, respectively. 7 We obtain two samples of women with elderly living parents: a sample of women between ages 50 and 60 who are age-eligible respondents of the survey and provide information on their living natural parents ("daughters" sample) and a sample of women in the same age interval who are daughters of (older) age-eligible respondents ("parents" sample). In the second case, the respondents are the elderly parents who provide some information about their living children. The set of variables available in each case overlaps but is not exactly the same. We use the daughters sample for the main part of our analysis because the most relevant information relating to employment and caregiving decisions is reported by the daughthers, the decision makers in our analysis. 8 Nevertheless, in section IVC, the main results are replicated using the parents sample and exploiting richer information included there on their health and on access to different sources of care.
Since sample sizes are too small at the country level, we group countries according to the availability and generosity of public formal care services and long-term care benefits. The results provided by the European Commission and the Council (2003) show a substantial degree of heterogeneity among European countries with respect to the availability and generosity of public formal care services and long-term care benefits. Northern countries are characterized by extremely generous and universal long-term care systems. In fact, these countries exhibit the highest levels of public expenditure on long-term care as a percentage of GDP (from 3% in Denmark to 2.5% in the Netherlands). Southern countries until very recently have had social assistance systems providing public care to meet only very basic needs of the poor elderly. Therefore, in these countries, the public provision of formal care has been limited in quality and quantity. In fact, according to results of the European Commission and the Council (2003) , these countries exhibit the lowest levels of public expenditures on long-term care (0.6% for Italy and even lower for Greece and Spain). Finally, central European countries fall in an intermediate situation. Regarding the level of public expenditure on long-term care as a percentage of GDP, this indicator ranges from 1.2% in Germany to 0.7% in Austria and France. Based on this, we group the SHARE longitudinal countries into the following pools: the northern countries (NC) of Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands; the central countries (CC) of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Switzerland; and the southern countries (SC) of Greece, Italy, and Spain.
The main variables of interest are those that measure the daughters' decisions about labor supply and caregiving activities. Regarding employment, SHARE respondents are asked about their current job situation. Based on this information, the employment decision is defined by an indicator variable, LP, that equals 1 if the woman reports being employed or self-employed (including working for family business) and 0 8 Another important advantage of the daughters sample is that it is much easier to build longitudinal linkages between waves since in this sample, the daughters are the respondents of the survey. For the parents sample, this linkage is very difficult because children do not have to be reported in the same order and do not have identification numbers to be uniquely identified between waves. Therefore, the longitudinal analysis of the data is based on the daughters sample. otherwise. 9 Although those who are working are also asked about the number of contracted and usual weekly hours of work in all jobs, we focus only on the employment decision. Variation in the intensive margin of labor supply is of secondorder importance relative to variation in the extensive margin both within and across country pools. 10 This is especially the case for the Mediterranean countries given the lower labor market attachment and the especially high prevalence of full-time jobs with fixed working schedules. Parental caregiving activities are identified from the information reported by each respondent about the provision of help to elderly parents living inside or outside the household in the last twelve months. This help refers to personal care, practical household help, and help with paperwork. Respondents who reported to have provided care to someone living outside the household also report information about the frequency of this care (i.e., almost daily, almost every week, almost every month, less often) and its intensity (hours). For those who reported providing care to an elderly parent living in the same household, it has to be daily because a "daily" filter is included in the opening question. No information on hours is reported in this case. The top panel of table 1 shows the prevalence of caregiving activities in our sample by country pool and intensity of caring. The variable Caregiver indicates whether the woman has provided any help to at least one elderly parent in the last twelve months 9 Our LP binary indicator is equal to 0 for unemployed women since our focus is on the employment decision and unemployment is not modeled in our theoretical framework given its low prevalence in our sample (5% for NC, 8.5% in CC, and 4% in SC).
10 Table A1 .1 in appendix A1 (online) shows some summary statistics of the distribution of weekly hours worked conditional on being employed across country pools. From this comparison, we can highlight several facts. First, differences in weekly hours worked are negligible between northern and continental countries. Second, differences between the former and southern countries are small and attributable to a smaller prevalence of part time work in Mediterranean countries. In fact, the percentage of women who work between ten and twenty hours per week in the sample of workers is 14.72 for northern countries, 18.41 for continental, and 9.27 for the southern. Table 2 shows the joint distribution of the employment and the intensive caregiving decisions. This gives a first insight into the relationship of both variables. In particular, these simple cross-tabulations show that in all countries, women who take up intensive caregiving to an elderly parent are less likely to be employed on average than women who do not. This difference is specially remarkable for continental countries, where 58% of daily caregivers are employed compared to 71% among nondaily caregivers.
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We construct a binary measure of the health status of elderly parents as an instrumental variable for the caregiving decision. SHARE asks respondents to rate their living parents' health status in a categorical scale. However, different versions of this item are applied in waves 1 and 2. Whereas 11 One may argue that coresidential and extraresidential care should not be pooled in the same caregiving measure. However, in our sample, this does not seem like a major issue because the number of respondents who report providing care to a coresident elderly parent is quite low. In northern countries, the fraction of respondents who gave informal care to a parent in the household was 0, whereas in continental countries and southern countries, it is 1.00 and 2.75, respectively.
12 To further check whether daily caregiving implies similar burdens in terms of daily hours in these three pools of countries, table A1.1 in appendix A1 (online) shows some summary statistics of the distribution of weekly hours of care conditional on providing care daily to at least one parent living outside the household. We note that weekly hours of care for these caregivers are somewhat larger in the South, but distributions are not very different among the three pools of countries. Employment and caregiving decisions are functions of other variables that shift the daughter's preferences and constraints like education, marital status, children, health status, age, nonlabor, income, residence closeness, and siblings. Definitions and more specific details about these control variables are provided in appendix A1 in the online supplement. Table 3 reports the means of the variables used in the analysis for the resulting sample of 2,549 women drawn from wave 2. These results show a remarkable North-CentralSouth gradient in some characteristics of these older women. For example, regarding employment, this difference runs from the highest employment rates in northern countries (83%) to the lowest rates in the southern countries (45%).
A similar gradient is observed for education, where northern women are more educated (the percentage of women with the lowest level of education is 5 in the northern area and 33 in the southern area, whereas the percentage of the highest educated women is 46.3 in the northern area and 20 in the southern area), and for health, where the percentage of women reporting excellent or very good health is also substantially higher in northern countries. With respect to income variables, northern and continental women have a higher median nonwage income. However, women in the South live closer to their elderly parents, as shown by the dummy variables that indicate whether the daughter has at least one parent living in the same household or outside the household but less than 5 km away. Finally, there is not a remarkable difference in the prevalence of parents in bad health. Overall, around 20% of women have at least one parent in this state.
III. Conceptual Framework

A. A Simple Behavioral Model
The relationship between employment and caregiving can be studied using a standard model of the daughter's time allocation decisions. The daughter is altruistic toward her parent, deriving utility from own consumption and leisure and from the well-being of the parent as follows:
where C is consumption, W p is parental welfare, and h is leisure. Parental welfare is
where PH is a binary indicator of parental ill health, IC is informal care provided by the daughter (time), and FC is formal care purchased by the daughter. The variable OC represents other inputs into parental welfare that are not directly controlled by the daughter, for example, any formal care not paid by the daughter or informal care provided by siblings. The derivatives of f are f 1 < 0, f 2 > 0, f 3 > 0, and we assume that the second cross derivative f 21 > 0. The ill-health indicator PH should be interpreted as a summary measure of disability or need of care, which is unaffected by IC itself. 13 The daughter's time endowment T is allocated to h, IC, and market work h. An implicit assumption is that the disutility of work and informal care is the same. The budget constraint is
where y is nonlabor income, w is the daughter's wage, β 1 represents any transfers the daughter receives from the state 13 Absence of reverse causality is a maintained assumption.
or from her parent in exchange for providing informal care, and β 2 is the price of formal care paid for by the daughter for her parent.
In this paper, we focus on the daughter's binary choices IC ∈ {0, IC} and LP ∈ {0, h}, where h is the fixed hours of work and IC is the time cost of daily informal care. Therefore, in the discrete choice version of this model, the daughter makes the binary choices IC and LP, as well as FC, which we need not treat as binary, taking OC and PH as given. Because our focus is on the binary choices and not on formal care, it will be useful to define an indirect formal care function that gives the optimal choice of formal care conditional on any pair (LP; IC). Let this function be FC (LP, IC; PH, y, w, OC; α, β) .
A potentially important issue neglected in this model is the type of living arrangements (e.g., coresidence between daughter and parent versus separate households). This, as well as the daughter's other choices and the other informal and formal care inputs OC, may be jointly determined as the outcome of a game played between different units of an extended family. With this broader perspective, some of our simple model's parameters such as β 1 or IC could also be endogenous. We can still interpret our model of the daughter's individual decision making as part of that larger model in which the values of parameters such as (IC, β 1 , y) are jointly determined, and we will attempt to keep this in mind in the discussion that follows. 14
B. Empirical Models and Parameters of Interest
Heterogeneity. The optimal decision rules for employment and care are a pair of binary-valued functions with parameters and arguments (α, β, h, IC; PH, y, w, OC) . Our econometric models approximate decision rules as functions of parental health PH and a vector of controls X, which includes country dummies, the daughter's nonlabor income y measured as household income net of her own earnings, preference shifters, observable determinants of wages (e.g., education), and observables relating to other sources of care (e.g., number of siblings). Conditional on (PH, X), the data give joint probability distributions for the discrete pair (LP; IC). We interpret these distributions as the integrals of the model's decision rules over the distribution of unobserved components of (a, β, h, IC, y, w, OC) . All the empirical work we report in section IV consists of estimates of the impact of PH in these decision rules, based on nonparametric and 14 Using a complete model along these lines to guide the analysis in this section is beyond the scope of this paper. To the best of our knowledge, no such model has been used in empirical work. Byrne et al. (2009) propose and structurally estimate a (noncooperative) game-theoretic model in which each sibling chooses labor supply, hours of informal care, and contributions to formal care, taking (separate) living arrangements as given. Pezzin and Schone (1994) model coresidence and the daughter's decision to work and to provide informal care in a cooperative framework in single daughterparent pairs. Other game-theoretic models include Checkovich and Stern (2002) , Engers and Stern (2002) , and Heideman and Stern (1999) .
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parametric approximations and ratios of these estimates, which are local average treatment effects.
IV Treatment effects and the behavioral model. In order to clarify the interpretation of our estimators, we link our behavioral model to the framework described in Imbens and Angrist (1994) on the identification and estimation of treatment effects using a binary instrument. 15 In our case, the "daily care" variable IC is the indicator of treatment, and the parental ill health indicator PH is the instrument.
The treatment effects framework defines causal effects in terms of potential outcomes or counterfactuals without relying on any functional form or distributional assumption. Define LP(1) as the employment decision of a woman if she were to provide care. Similarly, LP(0) represents the woman's employment decision if she does not provide care. Specifically, LP(1) and LP(0) are called potential outcomes or counterfactuals because they are not observed together for the same individual. For instance, if IC = 1 turns out to be chosen, we observe LP(1) but not LP(0). Our behavioral model can be mapped into this framework as follows. Let U(i, j) be the utility derived from choosing LP = i and IC = j. In order to evaluate U(i, j), we need to know the values of all structural parameters in equations 1 to 3 and the indirect formal care function FC(.). The optimal (LP, IC) pair is obtained by comparing the four utilities U(1, 0), U(1, 1), U(0, 0), and U(0, 1). Instead, the potential outcome LP(1) is obtained from the comparison of U(1, 1) and U(0, 1) and the potential outcome LP(0) from the comparison of U(1, 0) and U(0, 0). Given X and PH, the distribution over the unobserved components and the behavioral model determines a distribution of potential outcomes. To complete the framework, define IC(1) and IC(0) as potential outcomes for the treatment status given the instrument. Again, in our model, (0) . This means that any woman who provides care when her parents are not in poor health will also provide care if at least one parent experiences this contingency. Notice that this implies the nonexistence of defiers. Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that if the treatment regressor is binary and if there exists an instrument that is binary and monotone, an IV estimate can be interpreted as a 15 Our analysis in this section stems from the discussion of IV estimation of the effect of fertility on labor supply contained in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) . local average treatment effect (LATE) specific to the instrument. More formally, the LATE parameter for women with characteristics X is given by
which is the average effect of daily care on the probability of employment for the subpopulation of compliers. These are the women whose caregiving decision is changed by the value of the health instrument. In particular, they would not provide daily care in the absence of parents in bad health, but they choose to provide care when there is such a situation.
Is PH a monotone and valid instrument? The assumptions that need to be satisfied in the behavioral model and our empirical approximations to it can be restated as follows:
• Monotonicity: The treatment IC is monotone in the instrument PH.
• Exogeneity: The distribution of (a, β, h, IC, y, w, OC) conditional on X is independent of PH.
• Exclusion: The utility difference between working and not working, U(1, IC) − U(0, IC), should not depend on PH once we condition on the choice of IC.
The empirical plausibility of these assumptions is discussed in section IV. 16 
Parameters of interest identified in the IV-TE framework.
The LATE parameter is the average treatment effect for compliers, defined in equation (4) for women with characteristics X. The aggregate or population LATE parameter is
where the first equality integrates the Angrist and Imbens (1994) result, and the second is shown in Frölich and Melly (2007) . The complier subpopulation is of special interest because women who are driven to provide daily care because their parents are in poor health are an obvious target of any policy aimed at reducing the opportunity costs of informal care.
Next we look at direct employment and caregiving impacts. The numerator and denominator of LATE are parameters of interest in their own right that measure the effects of parental disability on the probability of employment and daily caregiving of daughters. Unlike LATE, these effects are averages over the whole population and can be consistently estimated under weaker assumptions than LATE because exogeneity is needed but exclusion and monotonicity restrictions are not. If PH is exogenous but exclusion restrictions are thought to fail, causal intepretations of the employment and caregiving effects are still valid but their ratio may estimate LATE with bias. 17 Regarding, compliance types, we compute the population proportions of compliers, never takers, and always takers from the population distribution of treatment and instrument status. The proportion of compliers is the denominator of the LATE parameter above. The proportion of always takers is Pr(AT) = [E(IC|PH = 0, X)]dF(X), and the proportion of never takers is Pr(
This decomposition is interesting for two reasons. First, the sum of always takers and compliers measures the quantity of daily care services supplied to disabled parents by the population of daughters. Second, estimating the mass of always takers allows us to separate the fraction of daily care services induced by true parental disability from that which is not, given the definition of disability implicit in the instrument. These parameters can be consistently estimated under monotonicity and exogeneity. That is, the exclusion restrictions are not needed.
IV. Empirical Analysis
A. Empirical Plausibility of IV Assumptions
• Monotonicity. Is the treatment IC monotone in the instrument PH? Monotonicity is highly plausible because we expect the marginal contribution of the daughter's daily care to the welfare of her parents to increase when the health of parents deteriorates. However, consider the following example: a parent in "not too good but not too bad" health, which we classify as PH = 0, receives daily care from his or her daughter. The parent's condition deteriorates to the point that the parent is institutionalized and ceases to receive daily care from the daughter. This is not implausible, and it would seem to violate monotonicity. However, a sufficiently strict definition of "not in bad health" (PH = 0) would essentially rule out this defier behavior.
• Exogeneity of PH. Is the distribution of (a, β, h, IC, y, w, OC) conditional on X independent of PH? This assumption requires that parental health status not be correlated with unobservable determinants of 17 For instance, a positive bias in the absolute value of LATE can arise if the daughter receives monetary transfers in exchange for informal care and the transfers for any given level of care are higher the more disabled the parent is. There may be a negative bias if the daughter purchases formal care and her expenditure depends on both her employment status and the health of her parent, even after conditioning on informal care. If the daughter's coresidence status or the distance that separates her from her parent varies with the health of the parent even after we condition on informal care, a negative bias results through the time cost of care and a positive one through economies of scale in consumption.
daughters' employment or caregiving decisions relating to preferences or human capital or labor market attachment. It seems likely that health capital of parents is in fact correlated with the human capital of their daughters. Exogeneity is plausible only if X includes appropriate controls for the daughter's own human capital.
• Exclusion. The exclusion restriction on PH requires that the utility difference between working and not working, U(1, IC) − U(0, IC), should not depend on PH once we condition on the choice of IC. A detailed analysis of the utility differences contained in appendix A4 (online) shows that this implies the following restrictions: (a) separability of parental welfare in the utility function: α 4 = α 6 = 0 (the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure do not depend on parental welfare); (b) formal care purchased by the daughter is negligible, or else the formal care function FC (LP, IC, PH) satisfies FC(LP, IC, PH; .) = FC(IC) (conditional on her choice of informal care, spending by the daughter on formal care does not vary with employment or with parental health); (c) transfers received by the daughter in exchange for informal care are negligible, or else the parameter β 1 does not depend on PH (i.e., conditional on the daughter's providing daily care, any transfers she might receive do not vary with the parents' actual disability status); and (d) limited effect of parental health on distance between parents and daughters (any effect of parental health PH on coresidence status of daughter and parent, or on how close the daughter chooses to live to her parent, operates exclusively through the daughter's caregiving decision).
We do not test the separability restriction in this paper. One can come up with examples of behavior that violate the restriction on formal care, but any bias in IV estimates is likely to be very small in practice to the extent that it is unusual for daughters to pay for formal care out of their own pocket. 18 We believe the same can be said of restriction c, but we cannot provide any direct supportive evidence. As for restiction d, we think it is plausible and note that it is not incompatible with choice-driven correlation between distance and PH in the data. Overall we think it is unlikely that violations of these exclusion restrictions are very relevant empirically, but for the most part, this is a maintained assumption. Note that if PH is exogenous but exclusion restrictions fail, causal 18 Expenditures on formal care by daughters are not directly observed. However, daughters are asked about "financial or material gifts or support" given to at least one parent in excess of 250 euros in the previous year to help with basic needs, a large item of expenditures, or a bereavement or illness. The number of yes answers is small: eight women in the North, sixteen in the Center, and ten in the South. Of these, only five women in the Center report that the reason for the transfer was "to help following a bereavement or illness." Even if direct information on purchases of formal care were available, testing the exclusion restriction would be difficult because the FC(·) function describes potential outcomes, so estimating the coefficients on LP, IC, and PH poses some of the same challenges we are trying to deal with in the first place.
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intepretations of the employment and caregiving effects are still valid, but their ratio may estimate LATE with bias. 19 
B. Parametric and Nonparametric Estimators
We report estimates of the impact of a change in the parental disability instrument (PH = 0 to PH = 1) on the daughter's employment (numerator) and daily caregiving choices (denominator), as well as the ratio of the two impacts, the LATE parameter in equation (5). This parameter can be estimated as a ratio of two propensity score weighting estimators as follows:
where the treatment in both numerator and denominator is PH, employment and daily caregiving are the outcomes, and Π(X i ) is the propensity score, the conditional probability of receiving this treatment. 20 Alternatively, as a parametric approximation, we compute the corresponding marginal effects of PH on LP and IC from the estimation of a bivariate probit model for labor market participation and daily caregiving with PH as a regressor. 21 We compute nonparametric and bivariate probit estimates with different sets of controls for different samples and different definitions of the instrument. In every case, we report impact estimates with no controls, which shows the unconditional correlations in the data. Ideally we would next introduce as many controls as suggested by theory in nonparametric matching estimators, which impose minimal assumptions on the distribution of impacts. Because sample sizes limit the precision of nonparametric estimates, it is clear that there is a trade-off between increasing the number of controls and allowing more flexibility in the specification of causal impacts. Our strategy is to explore increasing sets of controls, compare nonparametric estimates to those obtained from bivariate probit models, and switch to bivariate probits when sample sizes are too small (e.g., to obtain estimates for specific subpopulations of daughters).
19 For instance, a positive bias in the absolute value of LATE can arise if the daughter receives monetary transfers in exchange for informal care and the transfers for any given level of care are higher the more disabled the parent is. There may be a negative bias if the daughter purchases formal care and her expenditure depends on both her employment status and the health of her parent, even after conditioning on informal care. If the daughter's coresidence status or the distance that separates her from her parent varies with the health of the parent even after we condition on informal care, then a negative bias results through the time cost of care and a positive one through economies of scale in consumption. 20 The idea of the weighting using the propensity score is to create balance between treated and control units given that the distribution of X may be different in these two groups (Hirano et al., 2000) . 21 Note that the index restrictions implicit in the bivariate probit are equivalent to the monotonicity assumption (see Vytlacil, 2002) . care (1) care (2) prop. to
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C. Model Predictions about Parameter Estimates
Let us assume that the exclusion, monotonicity, and exogeneity assumptions hold. In appendix A2 (online) we derive expressions for the utility differences that measure the propensity to work conditional on caregiving status, which determines potential outcomes, and the propensity to provide informal care or propensity-to-care index, IC * (w, PH; .). Based on those expressions, we characterize the solution to the discrete choice time allocation model. In order to make empirical predictions about populations, we need to be more explicit about heterogeneity in the parameters (a, β, h, IC, w, OC) and aggregate across individual solutions. The simplest way of doing this is to consider a population with fixed values of (a, β, h, IC, OC) and heterogeneity in wages. We obtain results for such a population that are illustrated in figure 1 and derive predictions applicable to comparisons across country pools.
Propensity to work, reservation wages, and treatment effects. Let us assume that the propensity-to-work index is monotonic in w. This is a very weak assumption since it imposes only that the value of work increases with the wage. Second, we show that the effect of informal care on the propensity-to-work index is negative as long as utility is concave in consumption and leisure. Therefore, we have result A: there exist two reservation wages w r1 < w r2 partitioning the support of wages into three intervals within which the treatment effect of daily caregiving on employment is 0 (for low wages), −1 (for intermediate wages), and 0 (for high wages).
The decision to work trades off the marginal utility of increased consumption against the marginal disutility of reduced leisure. If utility is concave in leisure, the disutility of reduced leisure from work is even greater if the woman is allocating time to caregiving. Therefore, the reservation wage, which induces the daughter to work, is higher if she is providing care than if she is not. Daughters with very low potential wages are "never workers" who do not work regardless of their caregiving choice. At the other end, daughters with sufficiently high wages are "always workers" who work even if they have to provide daily care. In between, daughters work as long as they are not providing care and quit if they have to take up daily care.
The estimated treatment effects of daily caregiving on employment have to be nonpositive. Together with monotonicity of daily care in the instrument PH, this implies that the effect of parental disability on the probability that the daughter works should also be nonpositive. The LATE parameter should be highest (in absolute value) for subpopulations of women who are observed to work when their parents are in good health but have marginal attachment to the labor market, for example, low-skilled working women.
Propensity to care and compliance types. The propensityto-care index is (negatively) monotonic in the daughter's potential wage. Combined with monotonicity of the instrument PH, this implies result B: there exist up to two thresholds w c1 and w c2 partitioning the support of wages into three intervals within which all women are always takers (for low wages), compliers (intermediate wages), and never takers (high wages). Special cases arise if there is only one threshold separating compliers and never takers (with no always takers), or if there is no threshold because all individuals are never takers. Figure 1 illustrates our two main results. The figure shows the daughter's propensity-to-care index as a function of her wage, conditional on the health of parents. Consider the graph of the index that conditions on parental bad health (PH = 1). If the daughter faces a very low wage, the utility from caring is assumed greater than that of not caring, and she provides daily care. As long as her potential wage is below the reservation wage w r1 of result A, the daughter is a never worker, so the opportunity cost of providing care does not depend on the wage. Therefore, the propensity to care is flat as a function of the wage in this range. If the wage is between the two reservation wages, then caring induces the daughter to quit work. Therefore, the opportunity cost of caring includes the value of work, and in this range, the propensity to care is positive (in this example) but decreasing in the wage. For always-worker women with wages above w r2 , daily caring does not change their employment status, but the propensity to care is still decreasing in the wage. If the daughter earns a sufficiently high wage (w > w c2 ), the propensity-to-care becomes negative, and she will not provide daily care even if her parent is in poor health.
The second function drawn in figure 1 is the propensity to care when parents are in good health (PH = 0, labeled as "PH = 0, prop. to care (1)"). Note that it has kinks at the same reservation wages, but it it is below the first one for every wage because the marginal utility of caring is lower. Therefore, when parents are in good health, the propensity-tocare becomes negative at lower wages than when parents are in poor health. In this example, women with wages between w c1 and w c2 are the compliers who take up caring only when their parents are in poor health. Their number (the causal impact of parental disability on the probability of daily care) is given by the proportion of wage offers in that range, F(w c2 ) − F(w c1 ), where F() is the cdf of potential wage offers. The number of never takers is 1 − F(w c2 ), and the number of always takers is F(w c1 ). In the example, complier women with wages between w c1 and w r2 will quit work when they comply (treatment effect −1), and those with higher wages will not (treatment effect 0). Thus the impact of parental disability on the daughter's probability of employment is −[F(w r2 ) − F(w c1 )]. The LATE parameter is the ratio of the employment and care probability impacts,
. This is also the proportion of complier women who quit work.
Finally, in figure 1 suppose the propensity-to-care-index when parents are disabled is still the same as before but the index conditional on good health is instead the function labeled "PH = 0, prop. to care (2)," which is negative for all wages. In this case daughters never provide daily care when their parents are in good health. There are no always takers, and we say w c1 = 0. The impact on the employment probability impact is −[F(min [w r2 , w c2 ])−F(w r1 )], the impact on the caregiving probability is F(w c2 ), and the LATE parameter is again the ratio of the two. As shown in section IVC, the proportion of always takers ranges from negligible to small depending on the samples or the instruments considered. Therefore, this scenario is empirically relevant, and we take it into account to derive the predictions that follow.
Comparisons across country pools. Suppose the main differences across the three country pools (North-CentralSouth) are (a) the availability of formal care, interpretable as variation in the distribution of OC (to focus, consider the simplest case where there is a single value of OC within pools, which grows from South to North), and (b) differences in the labor market attachment of daughters, interpretable as differences in the distribution of wages w. Let the distributions of wages be ordered from North to South, in the sense of stochastic dominance. Using comparative statics results derived in online appendix A3, one can obtain the following empirical predictions:
C1: The mass of compliers plus always takers should increase from North to South. 22 C2: The estimated impact of parental disability on the employment probability of daughters should grow from North to South. This sharp prediction obtains as long as the proportion of daughters who are always takers is 0 or very small. C3: There is no clear prediction ordering the LATE parameters across country pools.
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D. Evidence from Cross-Sectional Variation in Parental Health
The top panel of table 4 shows the components of the Wald estimate and the nonparametric estimates conditional on a reduced vector of controls X for the sample of daughters interviewed in wave 2 (2006), who were between ages 50 and 60 at the time of the interview and had at least one living parent. The controls are the daughter's age, education, and number of living sisters. We do not report other estimates that we computed using the bivariate probit model or including a more extensive set of controls. The results were very similar, from which we concluded that the normality and functional form assumptions in the biprobit model and the use of a reduced set of controls provide good approximations. 23 The lower panel shows estimates for the longitudinal subsample of women who were interviewed in both waves. In this case, we report the components of the Wald estimate and biprobit estimates conditional on two different vectors of controls. First, we condition on the same controls as in the cross-sectional sample. Next, we add the first lag of LP. On both theoretical and empirical grounds, this is a potentially 23 The complete set of controls includes the woman's age, number of children, dummies for different education level, number of brothers and sisters, marital status, annual nonwage income, and dummies for health status. For a more detailed description on these covariates, see appendix A1 (online). Results on the estimations including the complete set of controls are available on request. relevant variable that is correlated with PH and omitted from the cross-sectional specification. 24 Columns 4 to 6 of the table report estimators of the denominators. For the Wald estimate, these ar just the difference in the proportion of daily caregivers between women with and without a parent in bad health. For the weighting estimators and the biprobits, the denominator is obtained by averaging the differences in conditional means across the distribution of the covariate vector X. If PH is exogenous, this estimate gives the causal effect of having a parent in bad health (PH = 1) on the daughter's decision to provide daily care. It is also the mass of compliers. For Wald estimators, the mass of compliers is positive and significantly different from 0 in all three groups of countries, ranging between 2.8% in the North and 17% in the South in the first row of table 4. The other rows show that the results are qualitatively the same when we introduce the controls: there is a large and significant effect of PH on IC in southern countries and smaller but still significant effect in central and northern countries. We thus find a NorthSouth gradient in the proportion of compliers that mirrors the negative North-South gradient in the development of public long-term care systems. As predicted by the time allocation model, the greater the availability of public formal care, the smaller the proportion of women who are induced to take up informal care. 25 24 Lagged participation is a good proxy for labor market attachment and potential wages. Furthermore, it may reduce search costs and is well known to be a strong predictor of current participation (see Eckstein & Wolpin, 1989; Hyslop, 1999) . On the other hand, including lags of the endogenous variables LP and IC could bias the estimate of the causal impact of PH when PH is serially correlated. On balance, we choose to include lagged LP but not lagged IC. 25 The prediction we derived from the model applied to the sum of always takers and compliers, and we are looking only at compliers here. However, in section IVC, we show that the North-South gradient is also observed for always takers and that the sum of always takers and compliers is dominated by the latter. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. For conditional LATE, we report the 95th percent bootstrapped confidence interval. Note that the estimator, because it is computed as a ratio, is not constrained to lie in the [−1, 1] interval. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1% based on t-statistics or confidence intervals depending on the column.
a Estimation with three controls: age, a dummy variable for less than upper secondary education, and the number of sisters. b Estimation with four controls: age, a dummy variable for less than upper secondary education, the number of sisters, and first lag for LP. Standard errors for the NC under specifications a and b are not provided because of convergence problems. NC, CC, and SC stand for Northern, Central, and Southern countries, respectively.
The first three columns of table 4 report the estimators of the numerators. This parameter is the causal effect of having parents in poor health on the employment rates of women under the assumption of exogeneity of PH. When no controls are included, all estimates are negative, as suggested by theory and increasing (in absolute value) from North to South. This is clearer in the longitudinal sample, where for southern countries, we obtain that women with at least one parent in poor health are 11% less likely to be at work than women with no parents in that situation. However, the size and significance and (to a lesser extent) the gradient of the PH effect on LP do not seem robust to the inclusion of covariates, which account for the human capital and labor market attachment of daughters. In particular, the estimated impacts decrease substantially and are no longer significant when we control for the daughter's education, and they almost fade away when we also control for lagged participation in the longitudinal sample. In summary, our point estimates show negative impacts of PH on employment of daughters across specifications and country pools, but based on this table, the effect of parents' ill health on the aggregate employment rates of their daughters would seem very small.
The last columns of table 4 show the estimates of LATE for southern countries. This parameter attributes any effect of parents' poor health on the employment rate of women to its effect on the provision of daily informal care, under exogeneity and exclusion restrictions. We first note that our estimates of LATE are very imprecise, and for this reason, we do not report estimates for northern and central country pools. Second, point estimates are negative in most cases, but they are small and not significantly different from 0 once we introduce controls. The most plausible interpretation in our view is that LATE for the whole population is negative but small because most women in their 50s who take up daily informal care are never workers or always workers. 26 
E. Evidence from Longitudinal Variation in Parental Health
A concern is that in the cross section, parental health could be correlated with unobservable determinants of LP and IC (preference shifters, human capital), even after controlling for the daughter's own health, education, and other characteristics. Table 5 reports new estimates of the impact of the health of parents in 2006 on the employment and daily care choices of their daughters in 2006. The estimates are now obtained for the subsample of women who had parents in good health in 2004. Estimation on this "conditional" longitudinal sample exploits the impact of longitudinal variation in the instrument on the cross-sectional distribution of employment and caregiving. One may argue that using longitudinal variation in parental health should move us closer to the ideal experiment in which we observe the (ceteris paribus) effect of an exogenous shock to the health of parents. The estimates still have the same (causal) interpretation in terms of the static behavioral model. Furthermore, even if we focus on 704 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS the second wave outcomes, we can control for the daughter's lagged participation for which there is a solid basis in labor economics. On the downside, the sample size is smaller and the parental health instrument has less variation in the longitudinal dimension than in the cross section as it is shown in the last panel of table 5, both of which reduce the precision of the estimates.
In the first panel, we show the components of the Wald estimate and the bivariate probit models controling for age, education, number of sisters, and lagged participation. With and without controls, our estimate of the impact of an adverse shock to parental health on the probability of daily caregiving by the daughter in southern countries is large (+23%) and significant, and substantially smaller (+9%) and marginally significant in central and northern countries. As to the effect of the health shock on the probability of employment, the estimate without controls in southern countries is very large (−22%). In this case, a substantial effect remains when we introduce controls: the rate of employment is reduced by 10%. The estimate of LATE is −0.44. The point estimates of the employment effect and of LATE are significantly different from 0 at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. In spite of the limited precision of point estimates, we conclude that there is a significantly negative effect of the health of parents on the aggregate employment rate of their daughters, mediated through the provision of daily informal care. 27 We obtain small (and not significant) employment effects in the other country pools.
The empirical North-South gradients that we find in caregiving and employment impacts are in line with the predictions of the behavioral model. Both employment and caregiving effects in the South are stronger than those we obtained from cross-sectional variation in the health of parents. This is remarkable because one might expect any failure of exogeneity in cross-sectional variation to bias the estimates of employment impacts upward in absolute value. One plausible interpretation, beyond the scope of our model, is that it takes time for families and daughters in the South to adjust to shocks to the health of parents and that longitudinal variation identifies the short-run effect while cross-sectional variation identifies a smaller long-term effect. Another consideration is that our estimates of aggregate effects integrate groupspecific impacts over the marginal distribution of covariates and that this distribution varies from the cross-sectional sample to the conditional longitudinal sample. However, we believe that this composition effect is not the main driver of the difference between cross-sectional and longitudinal impacts. 28 27 Because the literature has often distinguished between employment effects of caregiving for coresident and extraresidential daughters, we have computed the estimators for the subsample of extraresidential daughters. The results are very similar. 28 We estimated the biprobit model for 2006 including the vector of three covariates and using the longitudinal sample of women with parents in good health in 2004. The estimated coefficients from this conditional subsample were used to compute our parameters of interest using both the cross-section and the full longitudinal sample. This allows us to compare
In the second panel of table 5, we shift the focus to impact estimates for particular subgroups. First, we empirically confirm a conjecture we made in the analysis of the behavioral model that the largest impact of poor health of parents on the employment rates of daughters should be found for those who are above (but close to) the margin of participation. To approximate this condition, we select southern women who were working in the previous period but have low education. For this group, the estimated impact of PH = 1 on the employment rate of daughters is −19%, which is twice as much as the aggregate impact and stands in even sharper contrast with the impact for women who were not working in the previous wave (−3%). However, the former is not precisely estimated. The employment impact is also smaller for lagged participants with higher education, who are presumably not as close to the margin of participation.
There is some concern that in the absence of other changes, the supply of informal caregivers will decline in southern European countries with the gradual increase of education and labor market attachment of daughters who are the primary providers. Motivated by this, we compute the proportion of daughters who are always takers or compliers, a measure of the potential supply of daily informal caregivers, and we compare this quantity across high and low education classes. For each education class, we integrate over the marginal distribution of the other covariates. This includes lagged participation, which reduces the propensity to care and is systematically higher for more educated women. We find that the supply of daily caregivers in southern countries decreases from 33% to 26% when comparing low and high education categories.
F. Using Multiple Measures of Parental Disability
In this section we obtain additional evidence using the parents sample described in section II. This is a sample of women aged between 50 and 60 who are the daughters of sample respondents. It provides more comprehensive information, reported by the elderly parents themselves, on their health status and their access to different sources of care. In addition to self-reported general health, other health measures are available such as (self-reported) diagnosed chronic conditions, functional limitations, limitations of activities of daily living (ADLs) and instrumental ADLs (IADLs), problems with mobility, depressive symptoms, and mental health. Although subjective self-reports of general health have proved to be informative about an individual's health, using multiple indicators is preferable. Information on limitations with daily living activities and chronic diseases like mental health problems should capture with more accuracy symptoms and problems related to dependency or need of the estimates obtained exploiting the cross-sectional or longitudinal variation of the instrument but keeping the distribution of observables of X s constant. The results of this exercise suggest that changes in the distribution of X s do not play a major role.
care. Using these instruments can give us a finer picture of the impact of parental health on the time allocation of daughters, for example, the proportion of complier women who are induced to take up daily care and quit work for different types and intensities of parental disability.
We construct five indicators. First, we define a binary subjective indicator based on the categorical variable on selfreported general health provided by the parents. We use the same definition as for the daughters sample so that the binary variable POOR is set to 1 if at least one parent is in a poor health status. Second, we construct two dummy variables based on the so-called Katz Index of Independence in Activities of Daily Living. This index is commonly used to assess functional status based on the individual's self-sufficiency in six activities: bathing, dressing, toileting, transferring, continence, and feeding. One point is given for each activity, and the index is the aggregate score. Therefore, it is a discrete variable that ranges from 0 to 6, where 0 means the highest level of dependence and 6 means complete independence or "absence of (limitations in) ADLs." The dummy variable Katz012 indicates whether at least one parent has a Katz index less than or equal to 2. That is, at least four ADL conditions are reported, which suggests a severe degree of dependence. The variable Katz345 indicates whether at least one parent has a Katz index between 3 and 5. That is, between one and three ADLs are present, which reflects a moderate level of dependence. Third, we also include a binary variable DEMENTIA that equals 1 if at least one parent has Alzheimer's, dementia, organic brain syndrome, senility, or any other serious memory impairment. Fourth, the indicator MOBILITY is set to 1 if there is at least one parent with three or more functional limitations due to health problems. 29 The main outcome variables (employment and daily caregiving) are analogous to those defined from the information reported by daughters. Therefore, the samples seem quite comparable. 30 With respect to parameters of interest, we do not have a binary instrument anymore but a vector of binary instruments Z = (POOR, Katz012, Katz345, DEMENTIA, MOBILITY ) . Different values of Z describe different forms and intensities of disability and parents' need of care. The conceptual framework described in section III is still useful if we reinterpret the variable PH in the behavioral model as an indicator 29 This refers to walking 100 meters, sitting for two hours, getting up from a chair, climbing several flights of stairs, climbing one flight of stairs, getting up from a chair after sitting for long periods, climbing several flights of stairs without resting, climbing one flight of stairs without resting, stooping, kneeling or crouching, reaching or extending arms above shoulder level, pulling or pushing large objects like a living room chair, lifting or carrying weights over 5 kilograms, like a heavy bag of groceries, or picking up a small coin from a table. 30 The only noteworthy exceptions are that the proportion of daughters coresiding with an elderly parent in the southern countries is larger in the parents sample, and there is a clear North-South gradient in the health of parents that was not apparent in the daughters sample. More detail on variable definitions and descriptive statistics is provided in appendix A1 and appendix A5 (online).
that takes values 0 or 1 for particular values or subsets of values of the vector of instruments Z reflecting different (and increasing) levels of disability.
In panel A of table 6, we show estimates of the proportion of daughters who are always takers, compliers, and never takers when the health of their parents is summarized in a single binary instrument so the events PH = 0 and PH = 1 are complements. We focus on the sensitivity of the mass of always takers and compliers to changes in the definition of the "good health" state (PH = 0). In the first row, for comparison with the daughters sample, PH = 1 correponds to "at least one parent is in poor or very poor health" and PH = 0 is the complement. We confirm the increasing NorthSouth gradient in the proportion of compliers (from 0 to 8% to 19%) and observe the same gradient in the proportion of always takers (from 1% to 3% to 10%). However, the comparisons across rows in the table are more interesting. In the second row, PH = 0 if the first four of the indicators in Z-POOR, Katz012, Katz345, DEMENTIA-are all 0, and in the third row PH = 0 if all five indicators are 0. The behavioral model predicts that as we consider increasingly strict definitions of "good health," the marginal utility of caregiving when PH = 0 should fall and the proportion of always-taker daughters should decrease. This is confirmed in the data. There are two additional implications of the model: first, daughthers who are not always takers become compliers; and second, it is quite likely that the treatment effect is −1 for women whose compliance status switches from always taker to complier. Therefore, a more subtle prediction of the model is that a broader definition of the benchmark good health can reduce the estimated impact of parental disability on the employment rates of daughters. We also see that as we narrow the definition of good health, the prevalence of poor health increases and the estimated proportion of compliers tends to fall. The former is a mechanical effect, while the latter is not. On the one hand, some always takers are now classified as compliers, as explained above; on the other hand, "poor health" has been broadened to include less serious conditions that induce fewer compliers. Thus, when the summary instrument uses all five disability conditions, the proportion of never takers is as high 98% in the North, 93% in the Center, and 82% in the South.
We now consider the impact of parental health changes from the benchmark value Z 0 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0), the best level of health that is observable, to other values of the vector, say Z j . 31 There are two good reasons to use Z 0 as a benchmark: first, changes from that particular benchmark make the assumption of monotonicity most plausible, and second, using a broader definition of good health may reclassify some compliers as always takers and hide part of the impact of parental disability on the employment of daughters. The LATE parameter for the particular subpopulation of compliers defined as women 706 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. For conditional LATE, we report the 95th percent bootstrapped confidence interval. Note that the estimator, because it is computed as a ratio, is not constrained to lie in the [−1,1] interval. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%, respectively, based on t-statistics or confidence intervals depending on the column. a Three controls: age, a dummy variable for less than upper secondary education and the number of sisters. Standard errors for the NC are not provided because of convergence problems.
NC, CC, and SC, stand for northern, central, and southern countries, respectively. whose caregiving decision is changed when going from the state Z 0 to Z j is given by
where the denominator measures the mass of compliers among daughters whose parents transit from good health to condition Z j . With five disability indicators, there are 2 5 −1 = 31 possible values of Z j . Alternatively, with PH = 0 still meaning Z = Z 0 , we can attach the label PH = 1 to any arbitrary set of values of Z that does not include Z 0 . Let Z denote one such set. For instance, if we define PH = 1 as "having at least one parent with poor mental health," the set Z includes all vectors of the form (., ., 1, ., .) . The LATE parameter is
Panel B of table 6 shows estimates for five different Z sets that partition the whole space of conditions. 32 The first two rows measure the impact of dependence as measured by the Katz index. 33 In particular, the first row (Katz012) corresponds to Z values of the form (., 1, 0, 0, .), or severe dependence. The second row (Katz345) corresponds to (0, 0, 1, 0, .), or moderate dependence. These two rows show that having ADL conditions has significant impacts on the probability of daily care in the South. Moreover, these impacts are larger as the level of independence decreases. However, the effects on employment are negligible. The third row adds the condition POOR and corresponds to (1, 0, ., 0, .). Again, we find significant impacts on the probability of daily care in the Center and South, and quite large in the latter at 17%. Furthermore, in this case, there is a significant and far from negligible effect (−16%) on employment in the South. The fourth row corresponds to (., ., ., 1, .)-DEMENTIA combined with any other condition. This condition has a prevalence of 8.5% in the South, and its estimated effects stand out among all others. 32 One can show that
, where the numerator and the denominator are weighted sums of the effects on employment and caregiving decisions of changes in health from Z 0 to each Z j in Z with weights given by the conditional probabilities of this parental ill-health state. 33 We gratefully acknowledge a referee for the recommendation of using the Katz index to measure the degree of dependence.
The proportion of daughters taking up daily care is 41% in the South and 25% in the Center, and there is a strong employment impact of −18% in the South. The fifth row reports the effect of MOBILITY alone, that is, (0, 0, 0, 0, 1). This condition induces significant (and smaller) effects only in the South. Finally, the sixth row shows the impacts linked to the summary instrument: at least one parent has at least one of the five disability conditions considered. We find significant employment effects of about −10% in the South. Therefore, the highlights of this panel are (a) the remarkable impact of parental dementia on daughters in the South and Center and (b) the large and significant effects we find for several forms of parental disability on the employment of daughters in the South. This is in contrast to cross-sectional estimates obtained from the sample of daughters, and part of the reason is our use of a stricter benchmark of good health as conjectured above. 34 As a result, (c) we obtain significant negative estimates of LATE associated with subjectively reported poor health, dementia, and the summary instrument. 35 Note that the estimated LATE associated with dementia is smaller. An interpretation of this is that the marginal utility of informal care is especially high when parents are demented. This pushes into the pool of compliers many more daughters, most of whom are not marginal workers whose employment status is affected by daily caregiving.
An additional advantage of the use of the parents sample is that it also allows us to include in the analysis some information on parents' access to other sources of care, both formal and informal. If parental disability PH correlates positively with the receipt of other care and measures of OC are omitted, the estimates of the effect of PH on the daughter's employment and care could be smaller (in absolute value) than the behavioral model's parameters. On the other hand, if OC is determined jointly with the daughter's choices within an extended decision unit, failure to include common determinants can lead to biases. As a robustness check we estimated specifications with better controls for OC. In particular, the binary variable Fcare indicates whether at least one parent has been in a nursing home overnight or has received home care in the twelve months prior to the interview. We also define an indicator Icare_other, which is 1 if at least one parent is receiving informal care from sources other than the daughter. These variables can replace the number of sisters, which we have been using as a proxy for "Other Care." The estimates (reported in panel C of table A5.3 in appendix A5, 708 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS available online) suggest that our results were not driven by the ommission of better measures of other care.
V. Conclusion
Daughters are known to be an important source of informal care for the elderly. What are the consequences for the welfare of daughters? For instance, establishing a causal link between informal caregiving and reduced labor supply could serve as partial justification for a policy such as public provision of care. A substantial body of research has sought to measure that link. In this paper, we combine a treatment effects framework and a simple labor supply model to interpret IV estimates of the employment effects of caregiving in Europe. We have focused on discrete-valued instruments summarizing the health and disability status of parents and on three parameters: the direct impact of instruments on the rates of employment and caregiving of their mature daughters and the ratio of the two, which is a local average treatment effect (LATE). All three parameters have straightforward interpretations and are informative in the policy debate. Our model shows that employment effects of caregiving are likely to be nonmonotonic over the range of wages. Therefore, the LATE parameters identified by our instruments could be quite different from an average treatment effect but arguably more interesting. The parameters we estimate do not predict the impact of the policy, but this impact cannot be derived from the distribution of treatment effects in a population facing a common policy environment. A much more structured empirical approach would be needed for that purpose. However, an attractive feature of our data is variation in the policy parameter across the countries represented in the sample, and our comparisons across country pools are informative about its importance.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, most women will never take up daily caregiving, but in southern countries there is a sizable group providing daily care. Second, there is a clear North-South gradient in the (positive) effect of parental ill health on the probability of daily informal caregiving by daughters. This gradient is robust to different specifications and samples and mirrors the NorthSouth gradient in the availability of public long-term formal care. Third, there is also a clear North-South gradient in the (negative) correlation between parental ill health and the probability of labor force participation of daughters, but the employment effect is much less robust to the inclusion of controls for their human capital or labor market attachment. Fourth, the employment and daily caregiving effects linked to longitudinal variation in the health of parents are stronger than those linked to cross-sectional variation. Fifth, the aggregate loss of employment that can be attributed to daily informal caregiving for women between ages 50 and 60 seems negligible in northern and central European countries but not in southern countries. Sixth, in the South, the estimated impacts of two broad measures of parental disability on the daughter's probability of daily caregiving and employment are around 20% and −10%, respectively, with LATE between 45% and 65%. Estimates of employment effects and LATE are not very precise. Seventh, even larger and strongly significant impacts are found for particular combinations of parental disability conditions (e.g., daughters whose parents have dementia). Low-skilled daughters who work but are close to the margin also exhibit larger employment and caregiving impacts even though the employment effects are not estimated with precision. Finally, our model offers plausible interpretations of most of our findings.
